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Abstract
Stulz (2005) has emphasised that for home bias to decline, insiders
have to reduce ownership so as to make purchase of shares by for-
eigners possible. We oer a decomposition in the ownership of shares
by foreigners into three parts: the change in insider shareholding,
the change in market capitalisation and the change in the fraction of
outside shareholding that is held by foreigners. As an example, this
decomposition is applied to help understand the sharp change in for-
eign ownership of Indian rms after 2001.
JEL Codes: G1, G15.
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11 Introduction
Three classes of explanations play a role in explaining the change in the
dollar value of shares of a country that are held by foreigners. Changes
in the market capitalisation could induce a bigger dollar value of foreign
ownership, if foreign investors preserve erstwhile levels of home bias. Changes
in insider shareholding could modify the space available for foreign investors
(Stulz, 2005), which we term the `Stulz eect'. Finally, the fraction of outside
shareholding held by foreigners could change.
In this paper, we oer a decomposition of changes in the value of foreign
ownership. This gives a simple accounting framework to assess the relative
importance of these three eects.
As an illustration, we apply these ideas to analysing the evolution of foreign
share ownership in India. India opened up to foreign portfolio investment
in 1993. In March 2003, the market value of shares owned by all foreign
investors stood at $11.5 billion. In March 2007, the market value of shares
owned by foreign investors had risen to $151.3 billion. Our decomposition
oers useful insights into this increase in the value of foreign ownership of
Indian equities of 13 times in 4 years. We nd that the bulk of the change
was caused by larger market capitalisation of Indian equities, and by a bigger
fraction of outside shareholding being purchased by foreigners. The `Stulz
eect' did not play a substantial role.
2 The decomposition
When analysing the dollar value of shares owned by foreign investors, three
sources of change can be identied:
 Change in market capitalisation
The simplest source of change in the value of shares owned by foreigners
lies in the change in the market capitalisation. An icapm portfolio
would hold more shares of a country when the market capitalisation is
higher.
 Change in insider ownership
Stulz (2005) has emphasised that insider ownership limits the extent
to which foreign shareholding can increase. As an example, the icapm
weight of India in the world portfolio is 1.5%. In this case, foreigners
2should own 97.5% of Indian rms. However, if insiders nd it opti-
mal to hold substantial stakes in the rms that they control, then the
elimination of home bias is mechanically infeasible. Stulz argues that
the elimination of home bias is hence infeasible until the institutional
environment of a country enables a shift towards dispersed ownership.1
 Change in fraction of outside shareholding owned by foreigners
The third aspect lies in changes in the fraction of outside shareholding
that is in the hands of foreigners. Traditional sources of home bias in-
clude rm characteristics such as liquidity, information and accounting
standards of the rm.
In order to obtain a quantitative sense of the role played by these three
aspects of the problem, we obtain a decomposition of F, the value of foreign
ownership of shares in an emerging market. Let
F = g(1   p)M (1)
where M is the market capitalisation of the country; p is the insider share-
holding and g is the fraction of outsider shareholding that is held by foreign-
ers. Total dierentiation yields:
F  M(1   p)g + g(1   p)M   gMp (2)
The rst term, M(1   p)g, can be interpreted as the change in F associ-
ated with a change in g holding other things constant. This corresponds to
traditional home bias explanations.
The second term, g(1 p)M, measures the rise in foreign ownership owing to
a higher M, holding other sources of home bias unchanged. It reects foreign
investors preserving their ownership of g(1   p) on a larger M, reecting
icapm-style reasoning while ignoring changes in world market capitalisation.
The third term,  gMp, may be termed a `Stulz eect', reecting the drop
in foreign ownership associated with a rise in insider ownership p, while
holding other things constant.
1Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2006) examine the empirical evidence from two points of
view. First, using aggregate data, they nd that the home bias of US investors declined
the most from 1994 to 2004 for countries which (a) had lower insider shareholding in 1994
and (b) had a decline in insider shareholding from 1994 to 2004. Further, using rm-level
data for Korea, they document how a sharp reduction in home bias was critically enabled
by a class of rms where the insider shareholding declined sharply.
3Table 1 Expansion of foreign ownership of Indian equities
Parameter March 2001 March 2007 Rise
(Billion dollars) (times)
CMIE COSPI market capitalisation 114.1 803.1 7.04
Foreign ownership 10.9 151.3 13.9
Table 2 Change in home bias against India
March 2001 March 2007
ICAPM weight of India 0.42 1.53
Actual weight of India 0.04 0.24
Home bias metrics
1 - (actual/ICAPM) 0.92 0.82
ICAPM /actual 10.38 5.42
This decomposition is not an economic model explaining the dynamics of
F. Rather, it represents an attempt at accounting for the changes in F and
obtaining a quantitative sense of the importance of the three forces at work.
3 An example
Our data for Indian rms is drawn from `Prowess', a rm-level database for
Indian rms from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The set of
rms that we focus on is members of the CMIE COSPI stock market index.
This is dened as all listed rms where trading takes place on atleast two-
thirds of the days in the last six months. We focus on data for 31 March of
each year, which is the end of the nancial year.
We focus on the period after 2001, a period in which there was stability
of capital controls and of the institutional features of the equity market. As
Table 1 shows, over the six-year period under examination, dramatic changes
took place in foreign ownership of Indian equities. While the Indian equity
market capitalisation went up by 7.04 times, the market value of foreign
ownership went up by 13.9 times.
Table 2 interprets these changes from a home bias perspective. The share
of Indian equity market capitalisation in world equity market capitalisation
went up from 0.42% to 1.53% over this period. The actual ownership of
Indian equities by foreigners went up from 0.04% to 0.24% of the world
4Table 3 Shareholding pattern of Indian rms
Year For. own. Insider own. Market capn. Foreign market capn.
(fraction of (fraction of (Trn. Rs.) (Trn. Rs.)
outsider) total)
2001 0.2049 0.4804 4.80 0.51
2002 0.2271 0.5122 5.50 0.61
2003 0.2105 0.5161 5.37 0.55
2004 0.2798 0.5354 11.51 1.49
2005 0.3091 0.5555 16.63 2.28
2006 0.3349 0.5323 29.69 4.65
2007 0.4100 0.5471 35.13 6.52
portfolio. While the normative share of India in the world portfolio went
up by 3.64 times, the actual share of India went up by 6.97 times. As a
consequence, home bias against India declined. The icapm weight went
from being 10.38 times bigger than the actual in March 2001, to being 5.42
times bigger in March 2007.
Table 3 summarises facts about our dataset. From March 2001 to March
2007, the overall market capitalisation of Indian rms went up from Rs.4.8
trillion to Rs.35.13 trillion. The value of foreign ownership went up from
Rs.0.51 trillion to Rs.6.52 trillion. Foreign ownership rose sharply from
21.05% of the outside shareholding (worth Rs.0.55 trillion) in 2003 to 41%
of outside shareholding (worth Rs.6.52 trillion) in 2007.
We nd that from 2001 till 2007, the insider ownership went up from 48.04%
to 54.71%. The `Stulz eect' was playing against foreign shareholding.2 At
the same time, the fraction of outside shareholding owned by foreigners went
up signicantly, from 20.49% to 41.0%.
Table 4 applies the decomposition of F in equation 2 to interpreting the
Indian experience. Because g, p and M undergo large changes, the calculus-
based formula is only an approximation. In the table, the three components
are shown, as is the discrepancy against the observed F. In 2004, the
discrepancy is 11% of F, but apart from that, it attains small values.
As an example, in 2007, F rose by Rs.1872 billion. We decompose this change
into three elements. It reects a decline of Rs.213 billion owing to the Stulz
eect, for insider shareholding went up in 2007. There was a rise of Rs.1011
2A decomposition by size (i.e. market capitalisation) shows that insider shareholding
went up in all size deciles between 2001 and 2007, except for a slight decline in the bottom,
8th and 9th deciles.
5Table 4 Decomposition of changes in value of foreign ownership
(Billion rupees)
Components
Year Traditional ICAPM Stulz Discrepancy F
2002 59 77 -40 -1 97
2003 -43 -13 -4 1 -62
2004 371 799 -62 158 950
2005 217 703 -104 28 788
2006 358 2046 231 269 2366
2007 1193 1011 -213 119 1872
billion owing to the rise in the market capitalisation of the Indian equity
market. Finally, there was a rise of Rs.1193 billion owing to an increase
in the fraction of outside shareholding held by foreigners. Re-expressing
the components as percent of F, the contributions were: +64% owing to
traditional home bias explanations; +54% owing to icapm explanations and
-11% owing to the Stulz eect.
4 Conclusion
This paper oers a decomposition of changes in the dollar value of shares
held by foreigners in a country. This constitutes an accounting framework
for assessing the relative importance of three factors: increase in market
capitalisation, decline in insider ownership and traditional explanations of
home bias. As an example, we use this approach to analyse the episode in
India, where the dollar value of shares owned by foreigners went up by 13.9
times over a six year period. We nd that the `Stulz Eect' did not play
a role in this evolution. Roughly half of the change was owing to increased
market capitalisation in India, and the remaining half reected the increase
in outside shareholding held by foreigners.
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